We define choice logic programs as negation-free datalog programs that allow rules to have exclusive-only disjunctions in the head. We show that choice programs are equivalent to semi-negative datalog programs, at least as far as stable models are concerned. We also discuss an application where strategic games can be naturally formulated as choice programs; it turns out that the stable models of such programs capture exactly the set of Nash equilibria.
Introduction
Stable model semantics [GL88] can be regarded as introducing nondeterminism into logic programs, as has been convincingly argued in [SZ90, Sac97] . E.g. a program such as ¡ ¢ ¤ £ £ ¡ ¢ has no (unique) total well-founded model but it has two total stable models, namely
where only the choice ¥ § ¦ ¢ ¤ £ © turns out to be acceptable (the alternative leading to a contradiction).
In this paper, we simplify matters by providing for explicit choice sets in the head of a rule. Using £ to denote a choice between and £ , the first example above can be rewritten as 1 .
£ ¡
Intuitively, is interpreted as "exclusive or", i.e. either or
£
, but not both, should be accepted in the above program.
It turns out that such choice programs, which do not use negation in the body, can meaningfully simulate arbitrary semi-negative logic programs, at least as far as their (total) stable model semantics are concerned. Since also the converse holds, we can conclude that, in a sense, choice is equivalent to negation.
Providing explicit choice as the conclusion of a rule allows for the natural expression of several interesting problems. In this paper, we show e.g. that strategic games [OR94] can be conveniently represented using choice programs. Moreover, the stable models of such a program characterize exactly the pure Nash equilibria of the game.
Choice logic programs
In this paper, we identify a program with its grounded version, i.e. the set of all ground instances of its clauses. This keeps the program finite as we do not allow function symbols (i.e. we stick to datalog). 
Definition 1

This problem is know as graph 3-colorability and can be easily transformed in the following choice program:
The stable models for this program reflect the possible solutions for this graph's 3-colorability:
stands for the sets of facts from the program.
It turns out that choice logic programs can simulate semi-negative datalog programs, using the following transformation, which resembles the one used in [SI94] for the transformation of general disjunctive programs into negation-free disjunctive programs. 
§
).
Definition 4 Let be a semi-negative logic program and let be the corresponding choice logic program. An interpretation
# for is called rational iff:
Intuitively, a rational interpretation contains a justification for every accepted ) 1
.
Theorem 1 Let be a semi-negative datalog program.
¡ is a rational stable model of
The rationality restriction is necessary to prevent ) 1 from being accepted without any of the elements of & being true. For positive-acyclic programs, we can get rid of this restriction.
Definition 5 A semi-negative logic program is called positive-acyclic iff there is an assignment of positive integers to each element of ' such that the number of the head of any rule is greater than any of the numbers assigned to any nonnegated atom appearing in the body.
Note that, obviously, all stratified [Prz89] programs are positive-acyclic. Still, many other "nondeterministic" programs such as
are also positive-acyclic.
Theorem 2 Let be a semi-negative positive-acyclic datalog program. There exists a choice logic program
We illustrate the construction underlying theorem 2 on the following program.
Intuitively, stands for "there is a proof for " while 
Choice programs can be trivially simulated by semi-negative datalog programs. 
Computing stable models
Stable models for choice logic programs can be computed by a simple "backtracking fixpoint" procedure. Essentially, one extends an interpretation by applying an immediate consequence operation, then makes a choice for every applicable rule 2 which is not actually applied 3 , backtracking if this leads to an inconsistency (i.e. the current interpretation cannot be extended to a model). We believe this procedure to be simpler than a similar one presented in [SZ90] for semi-negative logic programs. BF uses an auxiliary function fix depicted in figure 2 on page 8. Fix is a variation on the immediate consequence operator: it computes the least fixpoint of this operator given a fixed set of atoms that are considered to be false. Note that fix is deterministic since it only draws tentative conclusions from an applicable rule if there is but one possible choice for an atom in the head that will be true.
The main procedure BF in figure 3 takes two sets of atoms, 
Theorem 4 Let be a choice logic program. Then BF(fix(% ),% ), where BF is described in figure 3 terminates and computes exactly the set of stable models of .
Note that, because of theorem 1, BF can be easily modified to compute the stable models of any semi-negative logic program through its equivalent choice logic program.
An application to strategic games
A strategic game models a situation where several agents (called players) independently make a decision about which action to take, out of a limited set of possibilities. The result of the actions is determined by the combined effect of the choices made by each player. Players have a preference for certain outcomes over others. Often, preferences are modeled indirectly using the concept of payoff where players are assumed to prefer outcomes where they receive a higher payoff. 
Playing a game
consists of each player ¥ 6 selecting a single action from the set of actions £ available to her. Since players are thought to be rational, it is assumed that a player will select an action that leads to a "preferred" profile. The problem, of course, is that a player needs to make a decision not knowing what the other players will choose.
The notion of Nash equilibrium shows that, in many cases, it is still possible to limit the possible outcomes (profiles) of the game. Given a strategic game, it is natural to consider those moves that are best for player ¥ , given the other players' choices. Note that the construction of £ can be regarded as an encoding of the fact that the rationality and preferences of the players are common knowledge, as all rules interact and "cooperate" to verify atoms. This observation opens the possibility of extending the present approach to one where players may not be fully aware of each other's beliefs. This could be done, e.g. by considering a "choice" variation of "ordered logic programs"[GV91, GVN94, LV90].
Definition 8 Let
Another interesting aspect of theorem 5 is that, in combination with theorem 4, it provides a systematic method for the computation of Nash equilibria for (finite) strategic games. 
Relationship to other approaches and directions for further research
The logical foundations of game theory have been studied for a long time in the confines of epistemic logic, see e.g. [BB] for a good overview. However, to the best of our knowledge, very little has been done on using logic programming-like formalisms to model game-theoretic concepts.
An important exception is [Poo97] which introduces a formalism called "Independent Choice Logic" (ICL) which uses (acyclic) logic programs to deterministically model the consequences of choices made by agents. Since choices are external to the logic program, [Poo97] restricts the programs further to not only be deterministic (i.e. each choice leads to a unique stable model) but also independent in the sense that literals representing alternatives may not influence each other, e.g. they may not appear in the head of rules. ICL is further extended to reconstruct much of classical game theory and other related fields.
The main difference with our approach is that we do not go outside of the realm of logic programming to recover the notion of Nash equilibria. Contrary to ICL, we rely on nondeterminism to represent alternatives, and on the properties of stable semantics to obtain Nash equilibria. As for the consequences of choices, these are represented in choice logic programs, much as they would be in ICL.
The present paper succeeded in recovering Nash equilibria without adding any fundamentally new features to logic programs (on the contrary, we got rid of negation in the body). However, the results are restricted to so-called "pure" equilibria where each participant must choose a single response. We would like to extend the formalism further to cover, in a similar way, also other game-theoretic notions. E.g. we are presently working on extending our approach to represent mixed equilibria (which are probability distributions over alternatives) as well. Finally, as mentioned in section 4, using (an extension of) ordered logic could simplify the introduction of epistemic features into the formalism.
